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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
TRADE COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
UTAH RETAIL GROCERS ASSOC~ 
ATION and GEORGE INGALLS, 
dba George's Market, 
Plaintiffs in Intervention 
and Respondents, 
vs. 
JAMES L. BUSH, dba Bush Super 
Market, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Civil No. 
7783 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
In our main brief we first considered the question at 
issue from the cost point of view because the Utah Unfair 
Practices Act is a cost, not a price statute. In Point I we 
argued that cash discount stamps are an element of cost, and, 
as such, are covered by the statutory markup. 
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We next considered the question from the price point 
of view because that was the way the Trade Commission 
looked at it. In Point II we argued that cash discounts, as 
contrasted with trade discounts, do not reduce prices, but 
relate only to the terms of sale. 
After considering in Point III the element of intent, 
we then took up the constitutionality of the Act, and showed 
in Point IV (a) that the consequence of rejecting our argu-
ment in Point I was to render the statute unconstitutional if 
the question were viewed from the cost point of view, and 
in Point IV (b), that the consequence of rejecting our argu-
ment in Point II was to render the statute unconstitutional 
if the question were viewed from the price point of view. 
In either case, an unfair discrimination against the cash-
and-carry merchant and in favor of the credit-and-delivery 
merchant resulted. 
To find that our argument hung together, no matter 
whether the stamps were looked at from the point of view of 
the merchant's cost of acquisition or from the point of view 
of his selling price, gave us a feeling of complete assurance 
in the logic and validity of our client's position in this dis-
pute. That assurance is now made doubly sure by the in-
ability of the respondents to take a consistent stand in 
opposition. 
To meet Point I of our main brief it was incumbent upon 
our opponents to argue that cash discount stamps are not an 
element of cost, and, therefore, are not covered by the statu-
tory markup. Not only do they fail to make this argument, 
but, in Point IV of their brief, they adopt appellant's argu-
ment to the contrary. 
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To meet Point II of our main brief it was incumbent 
upon our opponents to argue that cash discounts cut prices. 
They did make this argument, but, again, offered no an-
swer to the constitutional problem which it raised. 
All of this we shall presently consider in more detail, 
but it seemed worthwhile to indicate at the outset that 
whereas our argument hung together no matter how you 
looked at it, our opponents' argument did not, and that 
respondents' position on the various points which we have 
raised is illogical and inconsistent. 
As a further preliminary observation, we 'call the 
Court's attention to the fact that our opponents make no 
record reference to the testimony or to the exhibits, and, 
therefore, as we understand it, adopt our statement of the 
facts; and that, taken as a whole, their brief is entirely 
negative in its approach to the problem under consideration. 
Their principal argument seems to be that if any discount 
is allowed, even though it be storewide and uniform in its 
application, and even though it be no greater than what 
is customary for cash discounts, the Unfair Practices Act 
will be nullified. This, we submit, is nonsense. 
Finally, we wish to observe that "the great price war" 
in the retail grocery business in Ogden, which was featured 
so prominently at the trial of this action, rates only a pass-
ing mention in respondents' brief. 
POINTS RELIED ON BY APPELLANT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENTS HAVE DEFAULTED IN AN-
SWERING POINT I OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
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POINT II 
RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO ANSWER 
POINT II OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENTS' POSITION ON THE QUES-
TION OF WRONGFUL INTENT IS BOTH UN-
CLEAR AND UNSOUND. 
POINT IV 
RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT MET THE CON-
STITUTIONAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY 
POINT IV OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
POINT V 
BRISTOL-MYERS v. PICKER, 302 N. Y. 61, 96 
N. E. 2d 177, and SCHUSTER & CO. v. STEFFES, 
237 Wis. 41, 295 N. W. 737 ARE NOT PERSUA-
SIVE. 
POINT I 
RESPONDENTS HAVE DEFAULTED IN AN-
SWERING POINT I OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
In Point I of our main brief we contended that the 
Commission had failed to make out a prima facie case be-
cause the Unfair Practices Act is a cost statute, not a price 
fixing statute, and the evidence did not show that Mr. Bush 
had sold any merchandise below either his actual or the 
statutory cost. We based this contention upon the fact that 
Mr. Bush's trading stamps, being an element of his cost of 
doing business, were covered by the statutory markup of 
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6%. We pointed out that cash discount stamps are an 
element of the cost of doing business on the cash-and-carry 
plan directly comparable to the extension of credit as an 
element of the cost of doing business on the credit-and-de-
livery plan and, in the same general connection, that trad-
ing stamps as an attraction may counterbalance the attrac-
tion of free parking or some other service. From this we 
argued that, if the statutory markup of 6% was intended 
to cover such of these costs as were peculiar to the credit-
and-delivery merchant, the legislature must have intended 
it to cover such of them as were peculiar to the cash-and-
carry merchant for, otherwise, it would unfairly discrimin-
ate between the two. 
Our opponents' only response is a quotation from 
Bristol-Myers v. Picker, 302 N. Y. 61, 96 N. E. 2d 177, on 
the difference between cash register receipts and free 
parking as advertising media and a quotation from Rast v. 
Van Deman, 240 U. S. 342, which is always thrown at the 
trading stamp companies in litigation such as this because 
of the colorful phrase "lure to improvidence." Neither of 
these cases is in point, and in neither of them was the 
quoted portion anything but obiter dictum. Neither of these 
cases had anything to do with a sales-below-cost statute, 
and, consequently, in neither of them was the Court called 
upon to consider whether trading stamps, as an element of 
the merchant's cost, would be covered by the statutory 
markup designed for that purpose. 
We shall presently refer at more length to Bristol-
Myers v. Picker, supra, for it is upon that decision that 
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respondents rest their chief reliance. Rast v. Van Deman, 
supra, stands only for the proposition that a retail sale of 
merchandise is a local act which comes within the police 
power of the State where it occurs; and its invidious slur 
upon the trading stamp business has been repeatedly re-
jected by Courts from one end of the United States to the 
other and, among them, by this very Court in State v. Holt-
greve, 58 Utah 563; which held that the trading stamp 
business, making possible the allowance of cash discounts 
on small purchases, was a legitimate enterprise. 
In Point I of our main brief, we also called the Court's 
attention to the fact that if stamps be considered as 
concessions, Section 16A-4-9 of the Act specifically pro-
vides that "in all sales involving more than one item 
* * * the vendor's * * * selling price shall not 
be below the cost of all articles * * * and con-
cessions included in such transactions" and that, there-
fore, even if we were to assume for the sake of the ar-
gument that the Act prohibits the granting of a cash 
discount on the sale of a single item marked up no more 
than 6%, it does not prohibit the granting of a cash dis-
count on a transaction involving several items when the 
average markup is more than s1;1fficient to offset the dis-
count. In this connection, we showed, first, that the aver-
age markup is 13%, or more than enough to offset the dis-
count in question (2.08%) . and, second, that it is only in 
one sale out of a thousand, a fact which is neither denied 
nor challenged, that the transaction is limited to a single 
6% item. 
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To meet this, our opponents argue that Section 16A-
4-9 is ambiguous (p. 16) and that the section obviously 
means that each item in a multiple-item purchase must bear 
its own share of the cost of doing business (i.e. must carry 
the statutory markup) without regard to the markup on the 
other items; and that to construe the statute otherwise is 
to legalize "loss leader" merchandising. 
Per contra, we suggest that not only is there no am-
biguity in Section 16A-4-9 but that, if there were, it should 
not be resolved in such a way as to convict a man of a 
crime. We are dealing here with an Act which carries crim-
inal sanctions. 
We also remind the Court that "loss leader" merchan-
dising is not charged here and is not here under consider-
ation and that it will be time enough to study its impact 
when, if ever, the occasion arises. "Loss leader" merchan-
dising consists of the granting of extraordinary markdowns 
on specific items, sometimes far below even wholesale prices, 
for the purpose of attracting customers into the store. The 
hope is that the customers will be misled into believing that 
everything in the place is a bargain and that, therefore, the 
consequent loss on· the "leader" merchandise will be more 
than offset by the profit on other sales. No such situation 
obtained in the case at bar. Mr. Bush gave no special dis-
counts, and offered no "loss leader" merchandise. He did 
not hold out to the customer an apparent saving on certain 
items in order to lure him into the store, as our opponents 
suggest, but offered a uniform cash discount on every item 
in his store. That is not "loss leader" merchandising. Talk 
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of "loss leader" merchandising is not germane to the pres-
ent controversy and not helpful in its solution. 
In Point I of our main brief we contended, finally, 
that if only one sale out of one thousand sales consisted of 
6% merchandise alone, a fact which was not denied, the 
consequent violation of the Act, if any, would fall within 
the rule of de minimis. The law does not concern itself 
with such trifles. 
In response, our opponents say, (pp. 14 and 15), that the 
rule of de minimis does not apply because a cash discount 
of 2.08% which has the effect of attracting customers to 
a grocery store cannot be considered trivial. But we did not 
make such an argument. Our contention, which we be-
lieve we stated in plain terms, was that if a discount 
of 2.08% on that one sale out of a thousand which relates 
to a single 6% item violates the statute, it is de minimis. 
No answer to this argument has been attempted. 
For the foregoing reasons, it may be said that our op-
ponents have defaulted in answering Point I of our brief. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO ANSWER 
POINT II OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
In Point II of our main brief we contended that the 
Commission had not made out a prima facie case even if the 
present controversy is considered on the basis of price, 
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rather than cost, for cash discounts, as contrasted with trade 
discounts, relate to the terms of sale, not the price, and, 
therefore, do not have the effect of cutting prices. As 
authority for this contention we cited Rosenkampff and 
Wide1·, "Theory of Accounts"; Weco Products Co. v. Mid-
City Cut Rate Drug Stores, 55 Cal. App. 2d 684; 131 P. 2d 
856; and a very carefully reasoned opinion by the Attorney 
General of Oklahoma. We also pointed out that the Utah 
Unfair Practices Act itself quite properly differentiated 
between trade discounts, which do affect prices, and cash 
discounts, which do not, by requiring the retailer to deduct 
the former but not the latter in determining his cost. 
Our opponents' response to this is to cite the Picker 
decision and Schuster and Co. v. Steffes, 237 Wis. 41, 295 
N. W. 737, to the effect that cash discounts do cut prices, 
and then go on to say, on the authority of the Picker de-
cision, that if a 2% cash discount does not violate the Act, 
a 6% discount will not violate it and the Act will therefore 
be nullified. The same could be said of almost any trade 
practice, no matter how free from illegality when legiti-
mately used. Almost any practice can be abused, but that 
is no reason to condemn it when it is not. As Judge Fuld 
said in his dissenting opinion in the Picker case, in which 
the Chief Judge joined, "Courts are not powerless to deal 
with obvious subterfuges. * * * There is time to deal 
with such situations when they are presented * * *" 
In the case at bar, we are not dealing with any sub-
terfuge. If the discount had exceeded the usual amount 
allowed as an inducement for prompt payment, or if it had 
varied in amount, or if it had been selective in its applica-
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tion, the case would be different, for a subterfuge would 
have been indicated, but such was not the fact. What we 
have here is a normal cash discount (R. 188), storewide 
and uniform in its application. 
Aside from offering the argument that, if a cash dis-
count were allowed, it might be abused, our opponents tried 
to explain away the California cases (Food & Grocery 
Bureau V. Garfield, 20 Cal. 2d 228, 125 P. 2d 3 ; and Weco 
Products v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, 55 Cal. App. 
2d 684, 131 P. 2d 856) and to derive some comfort from 
Sunbeam Corporation v. Klein, 79 A. 2d 603, and \Lambert 
Pharmat-al Company v. Roberts Bros., 233 P. 2d 258, but 
here we· submit they failed completely. 
The California cases cannot be explained away: in the 
Food & Grocery Bureau case the Court said, flatly, that trad-
ing stamps constitute a "discount given the customer in 
consideration of his paying cash;" and in the Weco Products 
case a higher Court said that this "ruling of the Court must 
be regarded as conclusive of the status of the trading stamp 
in commercial retail business." "A cash discount," said the 
Court, "is a trade practice long established, and is author-
itatively recognized as being not a deduction from the pur-
chase price." (Citing: Montgomery's "Auditing Theory and 
Practice," pp. 499-500.) Respondents read into the Food & 
Grocery Bureau decision an indication that if the complaint 
had not been. brought under the section of the California Act 
that forbade gifts but had been brought under the section 
which forbade sales below cost, the Court would have con-
demned the cash discount. T4,is is nQt only purely specula-
tive but it is illogical because~··. if trading stamps are the 
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equivalent of a cash discount, as the Court found, and not 
a gift, they do not constitute something for nothing and 
their effect is upon the terms of sale rather than the price. 
In this respect, our view of the matter is confirmed and our 
opponents' is rejected by the Court of Appeals of California 
in the Weco Products case which held that cash discounts 
do not cut prices. 
Sunbeam Corporation v. Klein, supra, which our op-
ponents cite for the proposition that the Supreme Court 
of Delaware held that it was a violation of the Delaware 
Fair Trade Act to issue trading stamps with the sale of 
fair trade items, did not in any way concern trading stamps, 
and was not decided by the Supreme Court of Delaware. 
Similarly, Lambert Pharmacal Company v. Roberts 
Bros., supra, which our opponents cite for the proposition 
that the Supreme Court of Oregon, but for the decision in 
Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers, Inc., 341 U. S. 
384, would have held that the giving of trading stamps 
with fair trade items effectuated a reduction of the price in 
violation of the Oregon Fair Trade Act, stands for no such 
thing. In suggesting that it does, our opponents draw from 
the conduct of the Court, in asking for a reargument after 
the Schwegmann decision, an intimation which the Court 
itself took pains to foreclose by saying, "we intimate no 
opinion on the questions originally presented and argued." 
Even without such a statement, it should be obvious that 
no intimation, one way or the other, should be drawn, for 
Courts make a practice of refraining from rendering de-
cisions on points which have become moot, and that, we 
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submit, is the reason why the Supreme Court of Oregon 
declined to go further with the case. The Schwegmann 
decision, by invalidating the Oregon Fair Trade Act as 
applied to non-signers, rendered the fair trade issues in the 
Lambert case moot . 
. There remains for comment only the concluding para-
graph of Point II of respondents' brief in which our oppon-
ents profess not to understand the logic of the argument 
commencing at page 34 of our main brief. We had there 
suggested that, when the legislature directed the retailer to 
deduct "all trade discounts" but forbade him to deduct 
"customary [i.e. "true" or "normal"] discounts for cash" 
in arriving at his cost of acquiring merchandise at wholesale, 
it indicated an awareness that customary cash discounts do 
not affect price. From this we argued that cash discounts 
should not be considered to affect the cost at which the 
ultimate consumer acquires the goods at retail for there is 
no reason to make a distinction in this regard between pur-
chases at wholesale and purchases at retail. Our opponents 
suggest, per contra, that the legislature intended to make a 
special exception in the case of the retailer and that its 
failure specifically to repeat this "exception" for the benefit 
of the ultimate consumer indicates that it intended the 
latter to be excluded from its benefit. This, we submit, 
is unsound, first because there is no conceivable reason why 
the legislature should have desired to make a special ex-
ception in favor of the retailer and our opponents do not 
offer any; and, second, because the legislature was not fram-
ing an exception but merely recognizing commonly accepted 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
accounting practice when it differentiated between trade 
discounts and customary cash discounts ; and, third, there 
was no occasion to define cost to the ultimate consumer, for 
it was cost to the retailer which the legislature selected as 
the index to legality: nothing is said anywhere about the 
ultimate consumer in that part of the Act now under con-
sideration. 
To ignore the fundamental difference between trade 
discounts and customary cash discounts ; to cry that if a 
normal cash discount is permit~ed, abnormal discounts which 
are subterfuges cannot be prohibited; to try to explain away 
the California cases (Food & Grocery Bureau, and Weco 
Products) ; and to draw unsupported inferences from the 
Sunbeam and Lambert Pharmacal cases is no answer, we 
submit, to Point II of gppellant's brief. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENTS' POSITION ON THE QUES-
TION OF WRONGFUL INTENT IS BOTH UN-
CLEAR AND UNSOUND. 
It is difficult to understand our opponents' position on 
the question of intent. 
Early in the trial they said that "an essential element of 
proof that we must bear here is that these sales * * * 
were made with the intent to injure competitors" (R. 68). 
This statement of their legal burden conformed to the 
very great weight of authority and was adopted by the 
Trial Court in its Memorandum Decision (R. 16). 
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At the close of the trial, however, they indicated the 
belief that if a man sold any merchandise below cost, as, 
in their opinion, the Act defined cost, he was guilty of an 
unfair trade practice and for that reason could be considered 
to have had a wrongful intent (R. 225-226). Practically 
speaking, this read the question of intent right out of the 
case. 
Now, in respondents' brief, they cite all the cases in 
support of the majority rule that a wrongful intent must 
be proved, and all the cases in support of the minority rule 
that it is enough to prove an injurious effect, regardless of 
intent ( pp. 28-33) , and, without commenting on the reason 
for the difference, which we explained in Point III of our 
brief, or indicating what their own opinion is, make the 
bald claim that they proved both a wrongful intent and an 
injurious effect (p. 18). At the same time, they seem to 
reverse the position that they took at the close of the trial, 
for there they indicated that it did not matter what the 
intent was if the act committed (sale below cost) was an 
act forbidden (R. 225-226), but now they say that, so far 
as intent is concerned, it does not matter whether the act 
committed was forbidden or not, or whether defendant in-
tended to violate the law or not, but only whether he intend-
ed to attract customers from other stores (p. 19). Having 
taken this position, our opponents go on immediately to say 
that it is always difficult to prove intent because no one will 
ever admit "that he intended to violate the law." This, of 
course, brings right back into the case the question of sub-
jective intent to violate the law which our opponents, appar-
ently, had just dismissed from consideration. With all of this, 
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we confess that we do not know where they stand on the ques-
tion of intent. 
Respondents make no claim that they proved any actual 
intent on Mr. Bush's part, except, of course, that he in-
tended to attract business to his store, an intent which has 
not heretofore been considered reprehensible. Instead they 
rely upon certain obiter dictum in People v. Pay Less Drug 
Stores, 143 P. 2d 762, to the effect that if a retailer sells 
merchandise below cost, as in that case defendant did re-
peatedly, admittedly and flagrantly, and engages in "loss 
leader" merchandising, which was also admitted, it may be 
inferred that his intent is to injure his competitors. At the 
same time, however, the Court, citing Balzer v. Caler, 
74 P. 2d 839, aff'd 11 Cal. App. 2d 663, 82 P. 2d 19, said, 
"It is, of course, true that all sales below cost are not pro-
hibited. Only those sales accompanied by the requisite intent 
are prohibited." The case, therefore, stands for the proposi-
tion that a wrongful intent must be proved as a question of 
fact and cannot be presumed merely because sales have been 
made below cost. This is made very clear by the Court's 
statement at page 767, not quoted by our opponents, that 
"There is no material and rational connection between the 
fact proved (sales below cost) and the fact presumed (un-
lawful intent)," and by the Court's invalidation, for this 
reason, of a statutory presumption of unlawful intent based 
on sales below cost. The decision, it seems, to us, refutes 
our opponents' position and sustains ours, viz : that a wrong-
ful intent must be proved and cannot be presumed. 
Such an intent was not proved in Balzer v. Caler, supra, 
by the sale of Cornflakes below cost, from time to time, 
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to meet competition ·and stimulate trade; it was proved in 
People v. Pay Less Drug Stores, supra, by "loss leader" 
merchandising and a large number of sales below invoice 
or replacement cost. It was not proved, we submit, in the 
case at bar by the issuance of trading stamps in an amount 
appropriate for an ordinary cash discount as a uniform, 
storewide practice, where the average markup was 13% 
(R. 158, 195), and where the sale of a 6% item alone would 
take place only once in a thousand sales (R. 141-142). 
So far as concerns the effect of the trading stamps, 
respondents proved no more than that they attracted 
customers to Mr. Bush's store, which, of course, we admit, 
but it was not shown that it was the stamps issued with 6% 
items, rather than the stamps on the other 75% of his mer-
chandise that constituted the attraction and it could hardly 
have been the stamps issued with that one sale out of a 
thousand sales which consisted of 6% items alone. 
POINT IV 
RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT MET THE CON-
STITUTIONAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY 
POINT IV OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
In point IV (a) of our main brief we argued that if 
trading. stamps are an element of cost and if, as such, they 
are not covered by the statutory markup of 6%, the statute 
is unconstitutional because, so construed, the markup would 
cover all of the costs of the credit-and-delivery merchant but 
only some of the costs of his cash-and-carry competitor, 
and, hence, would unfairly discriminate in favor of the 
former and against the latter. 
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Instead of attempting to refute this argument, our op-
ponents dismiss it with the statement that the basis for it 
does not exist because, in fact, the statute does not dis-
criminate but covers all of the costs of both types of mer-
chant; and they then go on to quote the statute to show the 
validity of their statement. This is astonishing to us, for it 
is exactly what we argued in Point 1 of our main brief, and 
we only suggested the contrary in Point IV (a) in order to 
demonstrate the constitutional consequence of rejecting it. 
Our opponents have thus not only underwritten Point I of 
our main brief, but they have not even attempted an an-
swer to Point IV (a). 
In Point IV (b) of our main brief we argued that if cash 
discount stamps are an element of price, as our opponents 
think, rather than an element of cost, as we think, the Act 
is unconstitutional because it makes no allowance for the 
consequent difference in the overhead of the cash-and-carry 
merchant as compared with the overhead ~f the credit-and-
delivery merchant. 
Our opponents have apparently interpreted this as a 
plea that appellant be permitted to apply the statutory 
formula and then deduct all the costs that he can think of 
that he does not have but that one or more of his competitors 
do have. We made no such foolish argument, and, therefore, 
decline to be drawn into a discussion of it. The position that 
we took was much simpler and more logical: namely, if 
there is a fundamental difference between the overhead of 
two types of merchant, one doing business on the cash and 
carry basis and the other on the credit and delivery basis, 
the statute should take that fact into account because it 
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would be unfairly discriminatory under such circumstances 
to fit the two into the same statutory straight jacket on 
prices. This is what the Courts were talking about in Florida 
Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board v. Everglades Laundry, 
137 Fla. 290, 188 So. 380 (1939); Serrer v. Cigarette Service 
Co., 148 Ohio 519,76 N. E. 2d 91 (1947); and Cohen v. Frey 
and Sons Inc., 80 A. 2d 267 (1951), when they held that it 
was unconstitutional not to take such a difference into 
account in fixing or formulating prices for services or com-
modities; and these cases cannot be distinguished as our 
opponents' endeavored tQ distinguish them, upon the ground 
that they dealt with wholesale rather than retail prices, for 
the same principal obviously applies in each case. 
Either because they did not understand it, or because 
they could find no answer to it, our opponents have, to all 
intents, defaulted in answering Point IV (b) of our main 
brief. 
We see no necessity to discuss the blocks of cases cited 
at pages 26-33 of respondents' brief for the proposition that 
other courts have sustained the constitutionality of Unfair 
Practices statutes. Although we do make the point (Point 
IV (e) ) that the Act is indefinite where it should be quite 
definite, and although the Trial Court damned it with faint 
praise in finding that its "indefiniteness is not sufficient to 
hold the act wholly unconstitutional" (Memo. Decision), our 
principal point on the constitutional question is that it is 
not the way the Act is written but the way the Commission 
has interpreted it as applied to the facts disclosed by the 
present record that impairs its constitutionality. Little, if 
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any, light is thrown on that aspect of the discussion by re-
spondents' cases. 
POINT V 
BRISTOL-1l1YERS v. PICKER, 302 N. Y. 61, 96 
N. E. 2d 177, and SCHUSTER & CO. v. STEFFES, 
237 Wis. 41, 295 N. W. 737 ARE NOT PERSUA-
SIVE. 
Respondents appear to place their principal reliance on 
Bristol-Myers v. Picker because of the statements contained 
in the majority opinion to the effect that the giving of cash 
register receipts to the extent of 2112% of purchases was 
the equivalent of a price cut and that, if prices can thus be 
cut 21h%, there is nothing to prevent merchants from cut-
ting their prices as much as they please. We submit that 
the decision is not persuasive. 
In the first place, the case does not deal with an Unfair 
Practices Act but with a Fair Trade Act and this is a signifi-
cant difference for at least three reasons that come im-
mediately to mind. First, violation of Fair Trade Acts do 
not depend in any way upon the ascertainment of costs or the 
application of any formulae for the allocation of overhead. 
Accordingly, the intent of the seller in cutting the price, if 
that is what he does, is quite immaterial. Second, violation 
of a Fair Trade Act does not ordinarily carry with it any 
criminal penalties. And, third, since the object of the Fair 
Trade Acts is to protect the good will of the manufacturers 
of brand-name merchandise, anything which has even the 
semblance of reducing prices may impair the effectiveness 
of price maintenance. 
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In the second place, the distinction between trade dis-
counts and· cash discounts was not argued in the Picker 
case and we believe that it was for want of enlighten-
ment on that score that the majority of the Court could 
not grasp the concept of a discount which affected only 
the terms of sale, rather than the price, and could not 
visualize any limit to the discounts that might be given if 
even a small one were permitted. All through the opinion 
and also in the opinion at Special Term (195 Misc. 151, 89 N. 
Y. Supp. 2d 215) runs the thought that the defendants were 
engaged in giving something for nothing. The merchandise 
which could be secured in exchange for the cash register 
receipts was referred to as "presents" and "gifts;" the re-
tailers' organization which participated in the scheme was 
called a "Dividend Club ;" there was no limit to the extent 
to which the merchants could go; and, finally, their object 
was not to reward prompt payment for cash but to protect 
themselves from the competition of large department stores 
in neighboring communities. In other words, the picture 
was one of trade discounts, which can be limitless, rather 
than cash discounts, which must bear a reasonable relation 
to the financial benefits which flow to the merchant from the 
prompt payment of his charges, the saving to him on capital 
expense, reduction of bookkeeping overhead, and avoidance 
of losses on bad debts. True cash discounts, "customary dis-
counts for cash" have ascertainable limits. 
In the third place, the Picker case did not involve trad-
ing stamps but cash register receipts and the Court did not 
hold that they were the same thing. As we have pointed 
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~ out above, there is a definite distinction between the two, 
\~· for one is given to enable the retailer to operate his busi-
~ ness on a cash basis and the amount must be related to the 
:~ financial benefits flowing from prompt payment, while the 
~ other is given (or was in the Picker case) for quite another 
purpose and hence was "controlled" only by the exigencies of 
the particular competitive situation. 
As we read the opinion, the Court was aware of the 
distinction between discounts and free parking when con-
~~ sidered as ~dvertising media, ~iz: that one is directly related 
t- to the price of the commodity sold, while the other bears no 
relation to it, but the Court appears to have been com-
pletely unaware of the very close analogy between the cost 
to the cash-and-carry merchant of affording a discount 
as an inducement for the prompt payment of cash, and 
the cost to the credit-and-delivery. merchant of securing 
capital in order to extend credit. 
We are therefore much more impressed with the 
thoroughness and breadth of the decisions of the Cali-
fornia courts and the Pennsylvania Court in Food & 
Grocery Bureau v. Garfield, 125 P. 2d 3, Weco Pro-
ducts v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, 131 P. 2d 856, and 
Bristol-Myers v. Lit Bros., 6 A. 2d, 843, than we are by the 
Picker decision, for not only did one of these cases involve 
an Unfair Practices Act, rather than a Fair Trade Act, but 
they considered, separately and collectively, the financial 
as well as the advertising effects of cash discounts and 
~ showed an all around grasp of the problem which seems to 
us to be lacking in the Picker decision. We should also 
~ point out that the New York Court merely attempted to dis-
tinguish and not to reject these decisions. For the same 
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reasons we are impressed with the thoroughness of the opin-
ion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, which we have 
referred to at page 40 of our main brief and of which we 
shall ask leave to hand copies to this Court upon the argu-
ment of the present appeal. 
In closing we should also .refer to the case of Ed. 
Schuster and Co. v. Steffes, supra, cited by respondents along 
with the Picker case at page 9 of their brief, as authority 
for the proposition that cash discounts cut prices. The 
Schuster case, however, presented a special situation in-
volving the Wisconsin Regulation of Trading Stamps Act 
(Wisconsin Statutes Chap. 100, Sec. 100.15) which provides 
( 1) that trading stamps shall be redeemable only for cash 
in the amount stated on their face, and that (2) such stamps 
shall not be issued with fair traded items when the price 
obtained on the resale, less the redemption value of the 
stamps, is less than the stipulated fair trade price. The 
only issue, therefore, was whether the Act in question 
came within the police power of the State of Wisconsin 
and not whether trading stamps cut prices or merely af-
fected the terms of sale. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the trial court should be reversed and 
the complaint dismissed. 
Dated, June 2, 1952. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ATHOL RAWLINS, 
C. E. HENDERSON, 
of RAY, RAWLINS, JONES & HENDERSON, 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant. 
R. R. BULLIVANT, 
of the Oregon Bar, of Counsel. 
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